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CONSIDERATIONS

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OF

A F F A I R S

IN

E U R O P E,

And particularly with Regard to the Number of Forces in the Pay of *Great-Britain*.

THE SECOND EDITION.



L O N D O N :

Printed for J. Roberts in Warwick-Lane

1730. Price 1 s.



ON THE

IN

 H E Clamours indifferently raised against the Number of Forces, and particularly the *Hessians*, which this Nation has of late Years from the Situation of Affairs been obliged to maintain; have determined me to examine impartially, whether the Augmentation and Continuation of the Forces in our Pay, *British* or
A Foreigners,

Foreigners, beyond what was usual in Time of Peace, was a wise, just, and necessary Measure, in consequence of Treaties made for the Interest of *Great Britain*, and the Preservation of the Peace and Balance of Europe, independent of any other Interest and Consideration whatsoever.

In order to put this Matter in a true Light, I shall first take a short View of the State of Affairs that occasioned the making of those Treaties, and the Augmentation of Forces in consequence of them.

That the Treaty of *Vienna*, concluded between the Emperour and *Spain* in *May* 1725, was the only Source and Foundation of all the Troubles that have distracted *Europe* for some Years past, must be allowed by all ; and there is as little Reason to doubt, but that the Design of laying a Foundation for a formidable Power in *Europe*, by the Union of the two Families, was the chief Motive that induced those Powers to make and support, if possible, this Treaty, preferable to all other Views, and at the Hazard of all other Events.

As soon as that Treaty was concluded, the Accession was demanded of *England* and *Holland* by the Emperour, in a peremptory Manner,

Manner, and the Refusal of the Accession was follow'd with undeniable Proofs of a Design to deprive us of some of our Possessions; and both the *Dutch* and us, of some of our most valuable Privileges of Trade, and even to strike at the present happy Establishment of the Crown.

No sooner was that Treaty ratify'd, but *Spain* required the immediate Restitution of *Gibraltar*, as a Condition of Peace and Commerce between the two Crowns; and made no Scruple, at the same time, to declare publicly their Resolution to support the Emperour by Force, in Maintenance of the *Ostend* Trade and Company. Various Intrigues and Projects were set on foot at the same time in Favour of the Pretender. And all this was done without any Provocation on the Part of *Great Britain*, or without any Foundation for a Quarrel; or the least Pretence for a Complaint, so much as alledged by the Allies of the Treaty of *Vienna* against the Conduct of the late King.

He was engaged in no Treaties that could give the least Offence either to the Emperour or *Spain*, nor had taken any Steps that could disoblige or provoke the Resentment of either of them: He had acted as an impartial Mediator at *Cambray*, by Virtue of the Quadruple Alliance, for the Preservation of the

the Peace ; and had done nothing in Breach of the particular Treaty of Friendship and Commerce made between him and *Spain*, in 1721. And therefore, however desirous their Imperial and Catholick Majesties might be to become Friends, and make up their Differences between themselves; there could not be the least Pretence for their doing it at the Expence of *England* or *Holland*, as it plainly appeared they did by the Nature of the Treaty of *Vienna*, and the Measures projected in consequence of it.

Such undoubted Evidences in Facts of concerted Designs against the Interests of this Nation, not to say any thing of the Secret Articles belonging to that Treaty, called upon his Majesty, to strengthen himself with such Counter-Alliances as might enable him to disappoint or defeat those Designs.

An Alliance with *Holland*, whose Interest in most Respects is inseparable from that of *England*, was certainly the most natural and obvious on this Occasion : But the Constitution of that Republick makes it almost impossible to keep a Negotiation secret there ; and the Situation of their Country, with Respect to the Emperour, might expose them, before they could be sufficiently supported, to his Resentment, for entering into a Negotiation in Opposition to his Measures. Was it not therefore the most advisable Step for the
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common Good of both Nations, that *England*, being more immediately concerned in the dangerous Consequences of the *Vienna Treaty*, and farther removed from the Effects of any sudden Resentment, should first strengthen herself with some other considerable Powers, whose Interest it is to check the Imperial Power, by an Alliance, to which the Accession of the *States* might afterwards become easy and secure?

Accordingly, the Treaty of *Hanover*, between *England*, *France*, and *Prussia*, was concluded the 3d of *September 1725*. And whatever particular Reasons may have determined his *Prussian Majesty* to withdraw himself from that Alliance; yet, considering with what a jealous Eye the House of *Austria* hath all along looked upon the Increase of Dominions in the Family of *Brandenburg*, and how incompatible the real Interests of these two Courts are, the engaging the King of *Prussia* into the Treaty of *Hanover*, was in it self a right Measure, and had for some time the desired Effect.

And whatever Clamours may have been rais'd against an Alliance with *France*, as being unnatural to *England*, it was certainly in this Case, being made in Opposition to the Measures and Power of the Emperour, the most natural Alliance *England* could have.

The Animosities and Friendships between other Powers, may, according to new Incidents and Circumstances, frequently vary; but the Opposition between the Emperour and *France*, must be constant in all Junctures and Events. They may be in Peace sometimes, and have the Appearance of Friendship; but there must ever remain a Jealousy at bottom, and secret Rivalship between them, and an unalterable Desire in one to check the ambitious Views of the other: This hath ever been, and in all Probability will ever be the Case, as long as those two Powers, of *Austria* and *Bourbon*, continue to be so balanced, with respect to one another, as they are at present, and so superior in Strength, as each of them is, to any other Power besides.

But supposing *France* was not a proper Ally against the Treaty of *Vienna*, for preserving the Rights and Possessions of *Great Britain*, for which I will allow that *France* abstractedly might have no great Concern; yet as this Treaty was the Bond of a strict Union between the Emperour and *Spain*, and as that Union was founded upon the Prospect of Marriages between the Infants of *Spain* and the Arch-Dutcheßes, it must necessarily create the greatest Alarm and Uneasiness to *France*; for should those Marriages have been

accomplished, they would have occasion'd an entire Separation in Interest and Friendship of *Spain* from *France*, and the Death of one particular Prince might have render'd the House of *Austria* more powerful and formidable than ever, by the Re-union of Dominions that were once so terrible to that of *Bourbon*; and therefore, as long as the Union between the Emperor and *Spain* subsisted, on the Views above-mentioned, *France*, on Account of her own Interest, was the Power with which *England* might safely, and ought even preferably to any other, to make an Alliance at that Juncture, in order to obviate and defeat the dangerous Deligns of the *Vienna* Treaty: For *France* could never hope to compass the Dissolution of an Union so prejudicial to her, without resolving at the same time to be faithful to her Engagements, in support of the Interest of those who should be united with her in the same Cause.

This being the Situation of Affairs, the late King would have been wanting, in a due Concern for the Good of this Nation, for the Balance of *Europe*, and for the Dignity of his Crown, had he not fortified himself with the Treaty of *Hanover*, in Opposition to that of *Vienna*; the pernicious Consequences of which, with respect to the Possessions and Trade of *Great Britain*,

were already but too evident : But his *Unwillingness* to involve his Subjects in a War, and to put them to an extraordinary Expence, by any unnecessary Precautions, made him content himself, at the opening of the Parliament on the 20th of *January* 1725-6, with acquainting them with his having made this defensive Alliance ; without demanding more than the same Forces that were employed before these Troubles began, which were Ten Thousand for the Sea Service, and Eighteen Thousand Landmen.

In the mean time, the Consequences of the *Vienna* Treaty began to shew themselves openly, and the formidable Effects of it to be felt in most Parts of *Europe* ; the Emperour found Means to detach the King of *Prussia*, who hath a standing Force of about Seventy Thousand Men, from the *Hanover* Treaty. Great Remittances of Money were made from *Madrid* to *Vienna*. A Plan was framed for an extraordinary Augmentation of the Imperial Forces with between Thirty and Forty Thousand Men : And Negotiations were warmly pushed in various Courts, both in the Empire, and the *North*, for hiring great Bodies of Troops. These Negotiations succeeded so well, by the Help of Subsidies from *Spain*, that some of the Electors, and other Princes of the Empire, engaged

engaged to furnish about Twenty Seven Thousand Men ; and the Czarina having acceded to the *Vienna Treaty*, agreed to find a Body of Thirty Thousand Men for the Service of the Emperour and *Spain*.

These vigorous and warlike Preparations on the part of those Powers, to make themselves formidable on all Sides, did necessarily oblige the *Hanover Allies* to concert the proper Measures for their mutual Defence, and for preventing a new War being kindled in *Europe*. Any further Delays, to provide for Action, would have been dangerous ; and his Majesty had Recourse to his Parliament, for increasing the Number of Seamen, and for Allowance for such extraordinary Expence as the Service might require, which was agreed to by an Address of the House of Commons on the 25th of *March 1726* ; who desired him, *not only to increase his Number of Seamen, but to concert such other Measures, as would best conduce to the Security of the Trade and Navigation of this Kingdom, and the Preservation of the Peace of Europe ; with Assurances, that they would effectually make good all such Expences and Engagements, as should be made for obtaining those great and desirable Ends.*

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At this Juncture, and in Consequence of the Measures concerted between his Majesty and his Allies, the late King agreed with the Landgrave of *Hesse Cassel* for a Body of Twelve Thousand *Hessians*, to be ready to march for his Majesty's Service upon Demand.

France likewise increased their Forces, for the Sake of the Common Cause, with about Thirty Thousand Men: And gave Orders for raising Sixty Thousand Militia to garrison their Towns, by which they might be enabled to march all their Regular Troops into the Field, amounting to near One Hundred and Sixty Thousand Men.

In the mean time, the *Hanover* Alliance having been communicated to the *States General*, they acceded to it; and in Consequence of this Accession, the *Dutch* immediately proceeded to an Augmentation of their Troops, which they increased from about Thirty Thousand to above Fifty Thousand Men; requiring at the same Time that *England* and *France* would have their respective Quotas of Twelve Thousand Men in Readiness and at Hand for the Defence of the Republick, in Case of an immediate Attack; which they had more Reason to apprehend than any of the Allies, on Account

count of their Situation, with Respect to the Imperial Garrisons in the Low Countries on one Side, and of their being exposed on the other to the Forces of the King of *Prussia*, who had been lately gained by the Emperour.

This equitable Demand on the Part of the *States* could hardly have been answered by the King, if he had raised no Troops but in *England*. The *Dutch* are too well acquainted with the Accidents of the Sea, and the Difficulties and Delays which attend the Transporting great Bodies of Troops, to depend upon such Help in a Case, which if it happened at all, would be sudden and too quick to be withstood by slow Movements. The View of this made it necessary to have Foreign Troops properly placed; and the having them was the only Thing that enabled the King to do Justice to his Allies on this Occasion, by promising the *Dutch* that the Twelve Thousand *Hessians* taken into his Pay, should march, in Case of need, to their Assistance; and the *French* agreed to have as many of their *Swiss* Troops on the Side of *Flanders* for the same Service.

While the Imperial Negotiations succeeded so well in the Empire and the *North*, the Application of the *Hanover* Allies, for securing

curing the Courts of *Sweden* and *Denmark* to their Interest, was no less successful: *Sweden* acceded to their Treaty, and besides their Quota of Five Thousand Men, agreed to have a Body of Ten Thousand Men ready for the Common Cause; in Consideration of Fifty Thousand Pounds, to be paid for three Years by *France*, and as much by *England*.

About the same Time, the Convention of *Denmark* was finished, by which that Crown engaged to have a Body of Twenty Four Thousand Men, ready to be reinforced with Six Thousand more; for the Expence of which, *France* agreed to pay a Subsidy of 350,000 Rixdollars *per Annum* for four Years; and in Case of a War, to take Twelve Thousand of them into their actual Pay. His Majesty, as Elector, promised Twelve Thousand Men to join the Twenty Four Thousand *Danes*, and to have likewise Twelve Thousand more for a Reinforcement. By the same Treaty, *France* stipulated to furnish Thirty Thousand Men, as Occasion should require, for the Service of the Allies, in the Empire or the *North*.

His Majesty's Land-Forces in *England* were augmented this Year with about Eight Thousand Men; and he likewise increased his

his Electoral Troops from Sixteen Thousand to Twenty Two Thousand Men.

But here perhaps it will be asked, What hath *Great Britain* to do with this String of Foreign Troops? What have we to apprehend from the Forces of *Prussia*, *Muscovy* or the Emperour? What Good can the *Swedes*, the *Danes*, the *Hessians*, or *Hanoverians* do us? It was our Business to lie by, to wait, and see the Consequences and Events of the *Vienna* Treaty, and to take our Measures accordingly at a proper Season. This indeed would have been a very prudent Step, if the Terms of the *Vienna* Treaty, and the Measures taken, and the Forces raised in Consequence of it, by the Contracting Parties, had not been directly levelled at the Interest of *Great Britain*: This would be a very plausible Doctrine, if the Possessions of *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon*, if the Trade to *Italy* and *Spain*, to the *East* and *West-Indies*, and the *Baltick*; if the Balance of *Europe*, and the present happy Establishment, were become indifferent Things to this Nation; as indeed one would think they were, especially the last, by the Weekly Licentious Writings of some Gentlemen, who would be thought to be Men of no little Consequence. But as I do not believe that the Nation is yet grown quite weary of the

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Benefit of Foreign Trade, or of the Reign of the present Royal Family over us; and as those essential and valuable Points were struck at, some by the very Terms, and others by the immediate Consequences and Secret Articles of the Treaty of *Vienna*, I am persuaded that even those, who clamour so loudly against what has been done, would have censured the Administration, as guilty of the greatest Indolence and Folly, had they neglected to make the Treaties, to concert the Measures, and provide the Forces above-mentioned, for the Security of our happy Establishment, for the Preservation of our Rights and Possessions, and of the Peace and Balance of *Europe*.

Let us now take a short View of the State of the Confederate Forces, as they stood ranged on one Side or the other, in Favour of the Treaties of *Vienna* or *Hanover*, in the Year 1727; when the Preliminaries were signed.

The Augmentation of the Emperour's Forces by Recruits, or additional Troops, was between Thirty and Forty Thousand Men, which made his whole Number Two Hundred Thousand. By the Treaties he had made with the Electors of *Bavaria*, *Palatine*, *Cologne* and *Treves*, and other Prin-
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ces of the Empire, he had secured to his Service about Twenty Seven Thousand Men; and by the Alliance with the Czarina Thirty Thousand. He had likewise engaged the King of *Prussia* in his Interest, who has an Army of Seventy Thousand Men.

The Forces of *Spain* might be reckoned to be about Sixty Thousand Men, besides their Naval Power.

On the other Side, *Great Britain* had increased her Land Forces from about Eighteen Thousand to about Twenty Six Thousand Men; which was an Augmentation above the Complement we had before the Troubles began, of about Eight Thousand Men only. The Parliament likewise voted for this Year's Service Twenty Thousand Seamen; which being computed into the Service of the preceeding Year, when only Ten Thousand Men were voted, though more were employed, it may be reckoned that we employed Five Thousand more Seamen each Year, than in Time of Peace. Besides our Land and Sea Forces at Home, the Twelve Thousand *Hessians* were continued in our Pay.

The *French* had augmented their Regular Troops with about Thirty Thousand Men,

which increased their whole Army to about an Hundred and Sixty Thousand Men. They had likewise filled their Magazines, and provided Artillery and all sorts of Ammunition ready for taking the Field ; they had also got a disciplined Militia of about Sixty Thousand Men, and they fitted out for the Sea Service of this Year Twelve Men of War.

The Dutch, from their Accession to the Treaty of *Hanover*, in the Year 1726, had increased their Forces from about Thirty Thousand to above Fifty Thousand Men ; an Augmentation of about Twenty Thousand beyond what they had in Time of Peace : And they had likewise made Preparations to fit out Eighteen Men of War.

The Quota of *Sweden*, by Virtue of their Treaty, was Five Thousand Men, and they were also to have ready on Demand Ten Thousand Men more, by Virtue of a Subsidy to be paid for three Years by *England* and *France*.

By the Convention with *Denmark*, that Crown was to provide a Body of Twenty Four Thousand Men, to be reinforced with Six Thousand more, for a Subsidy paid by *France* for four Years.

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The King, as Elector, had increas'd his Troops, from Sixteen Thousand to Twenty two Thousand Men.

By this State of the Forces on each Side, it is plain, that the Measures and Motions of the *Hanover* Allies, gradually attended the Motions and Measures of those of *Vienna*; that their Counsels were prudent and steady; that they did not provoke and precipitate a War on one Hand, while they took Care on the other, not to be forced, for Fear of a War, and for Want of timely Preparations, into base and disadvantageous Terms. It is no less evident, that the Forces provided by *Great Britain*, were no more than a suitable Contingent, in Proportion to the Forces provided by the rest of the Allies engaged in the same Cause.

Thus Matters stood in 1727, when almost all the Powers of *Europe* were directly or indirectly engaged, and ranged on the Side of the Treaty of *Vienna* or *Hanover*.

The Measures of the first had been so well concerted, by the early Remittances of great Sums of Money from *Madrid* to *Vienna*, by the Accession of so many Princes, by the Acquisition of such a Number of Forces in the

the Empire, and the *North*, that their Imperial and Catholick Majesties thought their Plan for uniting their Families, and for laying the Foundation of a formidable Power in *Europe*, could not fail. They imagined, that *England* and *Holland*, destitute of Friends; exhausted by former Wars; apprehensive of losing their Trade and Possessions; threatened on one Side by the Forces of the Emperour; and on the other by those of *Spain*, must have acceded to their Treaty, and have served to strengthen and confirm their Scheme of exorbitant Greatness. But when the unnatural and incompatible Alliance, as it hath been called, between *England* and *France*, came to be fortified by the Accession of the *States*, and of other considerable Powers; when a proportionable Number of Forces, in Opposition to those of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, were provided; when a Plan of Operations was framed, and the Allies appeared ready to take the Field for their mutual Defence; and for preserving the Peace and Balance of *Europe*; while at the same time the Gallies (the great Resource for supporting the vast Designs of the Emperour and *Spain*) were detained in the *West-Indies*; the Imperial Ministers began to change their Language and Views: They would not venture to employ the Troops they had raised and hired, in beginning a War; nor second *Spain*
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in the Siege of *Gibraltar*, by making an offensive Diversion in other Parts ; and therefore they caused Insinuations to be made to the *Hanover* Allies, of their Desire to have Matters accommodated in an amicable Manner : That it should be agreed in general, to put Things on the Foot they were before the making of the Treaties of *Vienna* and *Hanover* ; and that whatever Differences remained between the contracting Parties, or their respective Allies, should be adjusted by Way of Negotiation at a Congress.

A Plan of Preliminaries was accordingly framed by the *Hanover* Allies, and sent to *Vienna* ; the Emperour agreed to sign them in *May* 1727, without staying for the Consent and Approbation of *Spain* ; which paved the Way, as it naturally must do, for the Dissolution of the Alliance between his Imperial Majesty and the King of *Spain*.

By this Means a Stop was put to all Hostilities in *Europe*. But *Spain* being provoked at these Steps towards a general Pacification, and having entertained some small Hopes of Disturbances in *England* on account of the late King's Death, thought fit to dispute the Execution of some of the Articles relating to Trade ; and consequently Hostilities still continued between that Crown and *England*
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in the *West-Indies*, which prevented the Meeting of the Congress. However, *England* did not slip this Opportunity of diminishing their Expence; for immediately upon the signing of the Preliminaries, Three thousand four hundred twenty eight Men were sent back to *Ireland*; while the Allies still kept the same Number of Forces on Foot.

This Dispute with *Spain* continued till *March* 1728, when by the Steadiness and Union of the Allies, she was brought to comply; and by an Act signed the 6th of that Month, *N. S.* all the Difficulties that retarded the Execution of the Preliminaries were removed; and in Consequence of it, the Congress was opened at *Soissons* the 16th of *June* following.

These were the happy Effects of the Treaty of *Hanover*, and of the prudent Measures and Preparations thereupon; a War that threatned all *Europe* was prevented, and a Foundation laid for bringing about the Dissolution of the formidable Union between the Emperour and *Spain*.

Here perhaps it may be asked, Why were not all the Troops, Domestick or Foreign, in our Pay, beyond the usual Complement in
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time of Peace, discharged after the War was prevented, the Preliminaries signed and ratified, and the Congress opened ? What further Occasion was there for any extraordinary Forces ? In Answer to this Question, another may be asked ; What did *England*, or indeed any other Country ever get by laying down Arms, or disbanding Forces, in order to make Peace ? They have very short Memories who have forgot the Consequences of such a Conduct ; but in the present Case, the Reasons will appear still stronger, if we observe the Circumstances and Nature of this Congress. Other Congresses were generally assembled after a War, in which the Superiority and Success of Arms on one Side, had disposed the other to sue for Peace, and consequently made the conquering Party Master of the Negotiations : So that as soon as the Preliminaries were once settled, there was little to be done but to reduce them into a formal Treaty for their final Sanction ; because the Fate of Arms had put the weakest Side under a Necessity to submit, in those Points which had been contested and occasioned the War. But in this Case, where each Side had only made Preparations for a War ; where Fortune had not decided the Cause for either ; both Parties met at the *Congress* upon an equal Foot to countenance and support their respective Pretensions, and it was

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easy to be conceived, that neither Side would be so weak and imprudent, as to venture to disarm, and by that Means being naked and defenceless, give the Adversary the Advantage of debating his Pretensions Sword in Hand : And consequently, as the Emperour and his Allies continued to keep up the same Number of Forces as they had before the Congress, *England*, *France*, and *Holland* were obliged to do the same. And this is the plain Reason why the Parliament, notwithstanding the signing of the Preliminaries, and the Meeting of the Congress at *Soissons*, wisely voted for the Years 1728, and 1729, Twenty two thousand nine hundred fifty five Land Forces, and the Continuation of the Twelve Thousand *Hessians*. And indeed it would have been a most dishonourable and unjust Part, with respect to our Allies, as well as the weakest that could have been acted with respect to our own Interest, if we had offer'd to diminish the Number of Domestick or Foreign Troops in our Pay, at the same time that our Adversaries kept up theirs; and that not only *France* still maintain'd their additional Forces of Thirty Thousand Regular Troops, and Sixty Thousand Militia, but even the Republic of *Holland* continued to pay Twenty Thousand Men more than they had before the Troubles began; an Expence which no body doubts

doubts but they would be glad to be rid of, as soon as their own Safety, and their Engagements towards their Allies, would permit.

Any Diminution therefore of our Forces at this Juncture would have been destructive to the whole Alliance; and in Regard to our own Interest, a most imprudent Measure: Because the Conduct of *Spain* made it but too evident, that the Points which were likely to be most strongly contested at the Congress, were such as immediately concerned the Interest of *England*, and of *England* alone; I mean *Gibraltar*, and the Privileges of our Trade.

The Preliminary Articles, by a Confirmation of all Rights and Possessions according to former Treaties, had indeed sufficiently secured to us these Points; but as *Spain* hath ever had at Heart the Recovery of *Gibraltar*, and as the pretended Abuses of the *Affiento* Trade had been extremely magnify'd; and the Advantages of these two Points to *Great Britain*, were look'd upon with a jealous and invidious Eye by other Powers; the *Spaniards* thought that nothing was more likely to create a Division among the Allies, than the bringing of them into Question, in which they were extremely

encouraged by the Opposers of the Administration, the pretended Patriots in *England*.

These Gentlemen made it their Business to undertake to prove, that his late Majesty, by a Letter he had written to the King of *Spain*, was engaged to restore *Gibraltar*: They made it their Business to endeavour to shew, that the Privileges of the *Assiento* Trade had been forfeited by the fraudulent Method of carrying it on: They industriously gave it out, that neither *France* nor *Holland* would or could with Justice support us in these Points; that Friends and Enemies, nay all *Europe*, were against us in them; while at the same time they vehemently inveigh'd against the Ministry, as if they had not taken sufficient Care to secure and maintain them: And thus while they themselves were the most forward and instrumental to make us lose these valuable Rights and Possessions, they began to be the most forward and loud, to complain and clamour at the Loss of them,

The Steadiness and Fidelity of our Allies prevented the Affair of *Gibraltar*, and the Disputes in Trade, from being brought before the Congress; but had we immediately, upon the Meeting of the Congress, reduced our
Forces,

Forces, and discharged the *Hessians*; had the Crown of *Great Britain* appeared there in a weak and naked Posture, entirely defenceless and indifferent, with respect to our own and the Pretensions of our Allies; we must not only have given up *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon*, but all Benefits of Commerce which the Emperour and *Spain* had thought fit to demand. Could we have expected that *France* and *Holland* should with their Power and Strength have supported our Advantages, and such Advantages which it is pretended they envy our having, while we appeared at the same time not only not in a Condition and Readiness to second their Pretensions, but even destitute of Strength and Power to support our own? This is so absurd a Way of Reasoning, that if it was not so frequent in the Mouths of the pretended Patriots, it would not be worth while to mention it.

The War then was prevented; Articles for putting all Rights and Possessions on the Foot they were before the Troubles began, had been signed and ratify'd: But as several Differences and Pretensions, whether well or ill founded, still subsisted; as the Emperour and *Spain* still continued united, the Work was but imperfect: A farther and more extensive Treaty was wanting, and consequently

ly the same Appearance of Steadiness and Force that prevented a War, was necessary to compleat a General Pacification.

What pass'd at the Congress, from the Opening of it to the framing of a Project of a Provisional Treaty, is not very material to the present Purpose. Upon the Whole, the Union and Firmness of the Allies in Force and Councils, diverted the opposite Party from bringing before the Congress any Matters of great Importance, or from pretending to contest with them any of their known Rights and Privileges; and the Imperial Plenipotentiaries were drawn by Degrees into a Separate Negotiation of a Plan for a General Treaty; and this was managed in such a Manner, that the *Spanish* Ambassadors were scarce apprized of it, which made them think themselves, and the Interest of their Master, neglected and abandon'd by the Imperial Ministers: They loudly complain'd of this Usage, and made strong and vehement Remonstrances against it to their Court. The King of *Spain* began to be alarm'd; and finding by the Nature of this Negotiation that a Provisional Accommodation was like to be made, and the Congress separated without any thing being fix'd and accomplish'd by the Imperial Court that might answer his Views in Favour of his Family,

Family ; he extremely resented such a Treatment, and by his warm Representations against it to the Emperour, he prevented the Signing of that Treaty. However, the Conduct of the Imperial Ministers in these separate Transactions, and the framing a Plan with so little Regard to the Interest of *Spain*, made such an Impression upon that Crown, and occasioned so much ill Humour and Disgust ; that from bitter Expostulations, *Spain* came in a Manner to a direct Breach with the Imperial Court ; which set a Negotiation on Foot between the Allies and *Spain*, and had the good Effect of separating that Crown from the Emperour, by the happy Conclusion of the Treaty of *Seville*.

From what hath been said, I think it undeniably proved, that Matters could never have been brought to so good a Situation, if we had neglected to concert the Measures, and provide the Forces we did, or if we had hastily disbanded them. It would have been the same Case, as if when two Armies were ranged in Battle Array, and ready to engage, and the Generals had, to prevent the Effusion of Blood, agreed to a Parley, one of them, before he saw the Success of that Parley, should have been so wise as to disband his Army : Such, I say, would have been our Case and our Wisdom, had we,
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upon Signing the Preliminaries, and upon the Meeting of the Congress, disbanded our Forces without waiting for the Success of our Negotiations.

I know it will be said by the pretended Patriots, Where are these Advantages of Peace and of preventing a War, if we still continue to be at the same Expence as if we were actually in a War? These Words have nothing in them but Sound; the Advantages of Peace appear by the Security of our Possessions, and the full Enjoyment of our Commerce: And can the Expence of Twelve Thousand *Hessians*; and of Four Thousand Seven Hundred and Twenty Nine Men; which was the whole Increase of the *British* Forces, from the Signing of the Preliminaries to the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Seville*, beyond what was kept up before the Treaty of *Vienna*; be compared with the great Augmentation of Forces necessary, and the Train of extraordinary and contingent Expences unavoidable also, in Case of a War? without saying any Thing of the uncertain Success of Arms, and where and to whose Advantage the Events even of a successful War might turn.

These Considerations are so obvious, that every prudent and impartial *Englishman* must conclude,

conclude, that preventive Measures, altho' the Operations are slow and gentle, are, to a free and trading Nation, preferable to the dazzling Glory and Eclat of Military Actions. No body thinks that it is either a pleasing or desirable thing to keep up more Forces than usual, in time of Peace : But if our Rights and Possessions are threatned, we must provide and prepare for a War, and even risk one for the Preservation of them; and if by the Continuation of some more than ordinary Expence, these Rights and Possessions can be secured until an absolute Peace can be settled by Negotiation; it may not be the most desirable Situation, but surely much preferable to that of War.

These were the Motives and Reasons for the Augmentation and Continuation of our Forces; since the making of the Treaties of *Vienna* and *Hanover*, to the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Seville*.

The Augmentation disappointed the dangerous Designs of the *Vienna* Treaty, prevented a War, procured the signing of the Preliminaries, and the Meeting of the Congress. The Continuation of the Troops during the Congress, enabled the Ministers of the Allies to turn the Negotiations to their Advantage; to separate *Spain* from
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the Emperour; to dissolve the Treaty of *Vienna*; and to re-establish our Possessions and Privileges of Trade upon their ancient Foot, by the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Seville*.

It comes next to be considered, why after these Advantages obtained, it is necessary to keep up any longer more Forces than are usual in Time of an absolute Peace.

But it may not be improper to observe first, that upon the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Seville*, there was an immediate Reduction of above Five Thousand Men of our *British* Forces; although the rest of our Allies, as well as our Adversaries, thought fit to continue the same Number of augmented Forces, as they had on Foot before the making of that Treaty: So that we kept in our Pay no more than the Twelve Thousand *Hessians*, beyond what we had before these Troubles began; and they were continued last Year by the Parliament, on a full Debate, as absolutely necessary for enabling his Majesty to execute the Engagements he was under by the Treaty of *Seville*.

That Treaty detached *Spain* from the Emperour, and made an absolute Peace between

tween that Crown and the Allies of *Hanover*.

But the Allies of *Hanover*, on the other hand, in return for the great Advantages they must reap from the Accession of *Spain* to their Interest by leaving the Emperour, were obliged by an Article of that Treaty to secure the Succession of *Don Carlos* to *Tuscany* and *Parma*, by the effectual Introduction of *Spanish* Garrisons, to the Number of Six Thousand Men, into the principal Places of those Dutchies. This was indeed a Variation from the Quadruple Alliance, by which the Introduction of neutral Garrisons only was stipulated for securing that Succession. But the Conduct of the Emperour, in endeavouring to delay and disappoint the Introduction of neutral Garrisons, and the Succession of *Don Carlos*; and the Steps taken with that View in the *Vienna* Treaty, without the Consent of *England* and *France*, contracting Parties to the Quadruple Alliance; sufficiently justified *England* and *France* in making this Variation without the Consent of the Emperour.

However, the Emperour made use of this Colour to execute the Measures since taken, of filling all *Italy* with Imperial Troops; and gave the Allies sufficient Reason not to depend upon a quiet and peaceable Introduction

of *Spanish* Troops into *Tuscany* and *Parma*, without being in a Condition to execute this Article by Force in Case of Resistance; and consequently made them think it necessary to keep a sufficient Number of Troops on Foot or that End. Our Allies therefore kept up their extraordinary Levies; and surely, if the Advantages of the Treaty of *Seville* be considered as they immediately concern this Nation, no body will say but that we were under an equal Obligation with them, to be in a Readiness to execute an Article of so much Importance: But the Necessity and Prudence of this Measure, will more plainly appear from the following Considerations.

1st. As to the Emperour, his Consent or Acquiescence must be obtained by way of Negotiation or Force.

That of Negotiation was certainly the most preferable Way, provided it was managed in such a Manner as not to give *Spain* any just Reason to complain, or reproach us with being dilatory or backward in fulfilling our Engagements. But it would have been the vainest of all Imaginations, for us to hope that the Emperour would comply on any Terms, though very advantageous to him, while at the same time, we should appear destitute of the Power and Means to make him apprehend

hend the dangerous Consequences of a Refusal.

The Separation of *Spain* from the Emperour, and the Birth of two Princes in *France*, had made a considerable Alteration in the Affairs of *Europe*, since the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Vienna* ; and might put it in the Power of the *Hanover* Allies, without any Danger to the Balance, to offer to the Emperour such Provisions for his future Security, as might remove all Apprehensions from the Admission of any *Spanish* Troops into *Italy* ; and be a Temptation to him to consent to that Introduction ; provided he was convinced, at the same time, that the Allies were able, by the Number of their respective Forces on Foot, to effectuate it without his Consent. But if his Imperial Majesty had found that *England* had disbanded *all* her extraordinary Forces ; the Consequence of such an Indifference on our Part, with respect to the *Hanover* Alliance, and to the Treaty of *Seville*, must have encouraged the Emperour to refuse the most tempting Offers, and to wait patiently for the Event of Things ; rather than consent upon any Terms, to secure the Succession of *Don Carlos*, by the Admission of *Spanish* Garrisons into the Places of *Tuscany* and *Parma*.

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If therefore the keeping up these Forces was necessary, even in Case of a Negotiation with the Emperour, and that the Allies should have made him any advantageous Offers to consent to a peaceable Introduction of Six Thousand *Spaniards* into *Italy*; much more would they be necessary, in Case the Emperour should resolve, in all Events, and at all Hazards, to oppose the Admission of those Troops; and consequently the Allies should be obliged to execute their Engagements on that Head to *Spain*, by Force: As they certainly must in Honour do, if the Imperial Court should any longer persevere in standing out.

2dly. We are obliged to continue these *Hessians* in our Pay, with Respect to our Allies; with whom we are equally concerned to fulfil the Treaty of *Seville*. *France* and *Holland* were Parties with us in the Treaty of *Hanover*; had joined their Forces and Measures with ours, for defeating the Designs of that of *Vienna*, and for preventing a War: By their Councils and Firmness united with ours, the Alliance between the Emperour and *Spain* was dissolved; by their Assistance and Guaranty we obtained an absolute Peace with *Spain*, and a Renewal and Confirmation of all our former Rights and Possessions.

Possessions ; for these Considerations they readily concurred with us, to promise that Crown the Introduction of *Spanish* Garrisons for securing the Succession to *Don Carlos* : And in Order to make good these Promises, and to complete the great Work of a General Pacification, they have thought fit to keep up the same Number of Troops as they had before the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Seville*. And can it be said with any Colour of Sense or Justice, that we should entirely disband ours ; that we should expect to reap alone the Advantages of these successful Negotiations, and of a perfect Peace, leaving the Expence of executing the Articles stipulated in Behalf of *Spain* to our Allies ; while by the Nature of the Treaty of *Seville*, it is plain, that the Interest of *Great Britain*, in all Respects, is at least as much concerned as the Interest of any other of the Allies, to have all the Articles of that Treaty entirely fulfilled ?

3dly. With Respect to *Spain* ; who hath a Right to demand of us the Execution of the Treaty of *Seville*, by the Introduction of *Spanish* Garrisons.

As soon as *Spain* had acceded to the Quadruple Alliance, *Don Carlos* had a Right to the Eventual Succession of *Tuscany* and
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Parma, and to have that Succession secured to him by neutral Garrisons. It was on this Condition, that those Dutchies were declared Fiefs of the Empire; and this was the Price and Equivalent for giving *Sicily* to the Emperour. Ten Years passed without *Spain's* being able to obtain this Security, while the Emperour hath enjoyed all this while the Equivalent for it; and had the Grand Duke died in the mean time, those Dutchies would in all Probability have fallen into the Emperour's Hands; an Event as little to be desired by *England*, as by *Spain*.

Thus Matters stood, when *Spain* being brought to a Temper of negotiating with the Allies, offers to abandon entirely the Imperial Court, to quit her vast Expectations from thence, and to enter into a strict Union with the *Hanover* Allies; provided they will secure that Succession, that had been so long stipulated in Favour of *Don Carlos* by *Spanish* Garrisons; Time and Experience having shewn, that the depending upon neutral Garrisons for that Purpose, was a very dilatory and precarious Expedient. The Allies readily agree to this Point, as being necessary for the effectual Security of that Succession, and justifiable with respect to the Emperour, who for so many Years, and
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in Breach of the Quadruple Alliance, was using all possible Means to defeat it. On this Consideration, an absolute Peace is made between us and *Spain*; all our Rights, Privileges and Possessions are renewed and confirmed; reasonable Stipulations are made for Reparations of past Damages; and the strongest Obligations given for putting our Trade on the Foot of former Treaties; which Treaties are particularly specified and confirmed, under the Guaranty of *France* and *Holland*. This being the Case, could we with Reason have expected or demanded of *Spain* the Execution of these beneficial Articles, if immediately on the signing of this Treaty we had disbanded all our Forces, and in a Manner declared to *Spain*, that we had got what we desired, and had no further Concern for the Performance of what had been stipulated for *Spain* in the same Treaty? How fatal the Consequences must have been to *England*, of a Conduct so destitute of common Honesty, and common Sense, are too evident to want any Explanation.

It may be here asked, But of what Use can the *Hessians* be for the Execution of the Treaty of *Seville*, and particularly for the Introduction of *Spanish* Garrisons into *Tuscany* and *Parma*?

I shall not pretend to determine what will be the Plan of Operations for the Execution of this Point, in Case a War becomes necessary. But it is obvious to every body that has consider'd the Nature of the Alliances subsisting in *Europe*, and how almost all the Powers are ranged, and engaged on one Side or the other; that sufficient Provision must be made for mutual Defence or Diversion in some Parts, while the Vigour of the War is pushed in others : That at the same time that his Majesty and the *States*, and the Princes in Alliance with us, may be engaged to furnish their Auxiliary Quotas of Men, Ships, or Subsidies, as may be agreed, to support a forcible Attempt upon *Italy*, their Dominions in the Low Countries and *Germany* or elsewhere, may not be exposed to the Insults of the *Imperial*, *Prussian*, or *Muscovite* Troops : That in Order to prevent the Emperour from increasing his Army in *Italy* with fresh Reinforcements from his Hereditary Dominions; or in order to oblige him to withdraw from *Italy* even some of the great Number of Troops that he hath already there, it may be necessary for the Allies to form a Plan of Diversion against his Hereditary Dominions; and consequently the Allies must respectively have a Proportion of Troops in all Parts for their mutual Defence

Defence against the Emperour and his Confederates, or for a Diversion to his Forces, as the Occasion should require : For it would be impossible, as the present State of *Europe*, and the Interest of the respective Powers are constituted, but that a War in one Part, though in *Italy*, must in a greater or less Degree, as the Plan of Operations shall be formed, affect the whole Confederacy on each Side ; and therefore proper Dispositions for Defensive or Offensive Measures, must be accordingly made. As the *Dutch* by their Situation are more immediately exposed to the Forces of the Emperour and of *Prussia*, would it be reasonable to call upon them to furnish their Contingent towards a War in *Italy*, without having any Forces ready for their Defence in Case of an Invasion of *Imperial* or *Prussian* Troops ? And as his Majesty might expect the like Insults upon his *Hanover* Dominions, out of Resentment for the Measures taken by him to make good his Engagements as King of *England*, it would be unjust to leave him exposed as Elector, purely on that account. The same may be said with respect to our other Allies ; and consequently, the Twelve Thousand *Hessians*, although not immediately embarked in an Expedition to *Italy*, for introducing *Spanish* Garrisons into *Tuscany*, would in Effect, according to the Disposition

tion to be made for mutual Defence or Diversion, be employed for the same End.

It may here be said, Well, the *Hessians* were kept up last Year, and his Majesty was enabled to make good his Engagements, and it was hoped that a general Pacification would be the Consequence of this just and powerful Alliance; but instead of seeing the desired Effects of it, we are no farther advanced than we were; we still remain in the same Uncertainty, and must still be liable to the same Expence; without any Hopes of seeing an End of it, or of enjoying the Fruits of a perfect Peace.

It is true, that the Introduction of *Spanish* Garrisons is not yet effectuated, and until that is done, it cannot be said, that the Pacification of *Europe* is established; and it is in Consequence true, that we must be at the same, and may perhaps be at a greater Expence than we have hitherto been, before that happy Period is arrived. But supposing that to be the Case, it is a Case of Necessity, of common Necessity, and we are not in a worse Situation than our Neighbours; our Allies have continued to keep up the same Number of extraordinary Forces, which in Proportion hath been proved to be as great as ours; we have this Year enjoyed, in all other Respects but barely the Charge of Twelve Thousand *Hessians*, the Benefits of Peace. And as to the Emperour, although he hath not given his Consent to *Spanish* Garrisons, yet his Condition is much worse than that of any of the Allies, and than it was last Year; he hath indeed lost no Towns, nor Battles, but the Number

Number of Forces he hath been obliged to march from his Hereditary Countries to *Italy*, and the great Charge he hath been at for all Sorts of Provisions and Ammunition, to enable them to Act, and take the Field, have made him suffer the Inconveniencies and Expence of an actual War, without having gained the least Advantages from it : His Troops were increased beyond what they were in Time of Peace with between Thirty and Forty Thousand Men. While he received Subsidies from *Spain*, that was no great Load upon him ; but the Separation of that Crown from him, and his being consequently deprived of those Subsidies, hath flung upon him the whole Charge of above Thirty Thousand Men more than he was able to maintain in Time of Peace. An intolerable Burthen to a Prince that is so destitute of Resources for Money : His Attempts to raise Money upon his *Silesian* Quick Silver have miscarried here, thro' the wise Provision in Parliament against it last Year, as well as in *Holland*, by the strict Injunction given by the *States* to forbid it ; and he hath felt the fatal Consequences of this necessitous Condition, without striking a Stroke : His Publick Lottery under the Guaranty and Protection of the Government, hath failed for several Millions of Florins : And if the Bank of *Vienna*, the Support of that Lottery, is not actually Bankrupt, yet it hath certainly very little Credit. The Additional Forces in *Italy*, beyond the usual Complement there in Time of Peace, cost the Emperour, as I am credibly informed, Nine Millions of *German* Florins *per Annum* ; which

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is about One Million Sterl. more than the same Number cost him in their former Quarters ; over and above the Contributions paid by *Italian* Princes. In the mean Time the late Revolution in *Turkey* must have given the Emperour the greatest Uneasiness and Alarm ; for altho' it is not yet certain that the present Sultan will turn his Arms against the Christians, yet the Imperial Court hath not received such Assurances to the contrary as can make them absolutely depend upon it ; and it is agreed on all Sides, that both the *Venetians* and *Muscovites* are under great Apprehensions of the Motions and Designs of the *Turks*, which must in no small Degree affect the Emperour.

This is the present Situation of the Imperial Court ; which may prove more advantageous to the Allies, than if they had gained an actual Victory. In this Situation it is not impossible, but that before the Time of Action approaches, the Emperour may, on certain Conditions, which the Allies of *Hanover* may venture to grant him, now he is separated from *Spain*, be disposed to consent to the Introduction of *Spanish* Garrisons into *Tuscany* and *Parma*, and by that Means compleat the general Pacification : But if he should continue still obstinate, there is no doubt, but the Allies must join in a proper Plan of Operations to force him to it ; which if concerted with Vigour and Union among the Allies, cannot, in all human Appearance, fail of having the desired Effect.

Although this Deduction is gone into so great a Length, yet it seems necessary, before
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I conclude, to remove some Insinuations industriously spread against the *Hessian* Troops; as if they were not hired, or continued in our Pay, for the Sake and Interest of *Great Britain*.

The Enemies to the Government, in order to give Weight to this false Insinuation, have employed great Pains to make it believed, that we have been involved in the Expences and Troubles of late Years, purely on Account of Pretensions and Possessions belonging to *Hanover*. But they have never been able to produce one Reason or Fact, during the Negotiations and Transactions of so many Years, to shew the Probability of such an Imputation: And if I am rightly informed, not one Word had passed for some Years, before the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Vienna*, about *Bremen* or *Vehrden*; and at the Time of making that Treaty the late King, as Elector, had not, nor hath his present Majesty, in that Quality, any Difference or Dispute about any Possession, with any Prince or State whatever.

It is indeed true, that since the Conclusion of the *Vienna* Treaty, and that his late and present Majesty resolutely supported the Honour and Interest of the *British* Crown and Nation, and would not make them subservient to the ambitious Views of other Powers; and that the Emperour could not find that Submission from the King of *England* which he expected from an Elector; Designs have been framed against his Electoral Rights and Dominions, upon Points in Appearance of no
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great Consequence to the Alliances now subsisting, or to the Affairs of *Europe*: And therefore formed with this artful View, only to put his Majesty under a Necessity (which every good Prince must be under in like Circumstances) to consult the safety and Preservation of his *Hanover* Dominions; and from the Measures taken for that Purpose, to raise a Jealousy in the People of *England*, that the Quarrel is purely Electoral, and that *England* ought to be no wise concerned, nor take any Share in it.

But his Majesty was resolved, notwithstanding any Menaces or Danger that threatned him as Elector of *Hanover*, not to give up the Interest of *England*; and the Parliament being convinced, that whatever he should suffer in his Electoral Capacity, must be the Effect of Resentment, for his Majesty's steady Adherence to the Good and Honour of this Nation, came to the following Resolution.

“ *That in Justice and Vindication of the Honour of the British Crown, they would effectually stand by and support his Majesty, against all Insults and Attacks, that any Prince, in Resentment of the just Measures which His Majesty had so wisely taken, should make upon any of His Majesty's Dominions, though not belonging to the Crown of Great Britain.*”

A Resolution founded upon the Rules of common Justice and mutual Defence; for if the *States General*, *Sweden* or *Denmark*, who, by Accession or Convention, were engaged with
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the *Hanover* Allies, had been attacked by any of the Confederates of the *Vicnna* Treaty, the rest of the *Hanover* Allies would have been obliged to have been concerned in the Defence of their Friend so attacked: *England* and *France*, and each of the Allies, on their Side, must have looked upon it as a Common Cause; and it would be most absurd to suppose, that the Parliament of *Great Britain* would not consent to defend the Foreign Dominions of their own Sovereign, as well as those of *Sweden* or *Denmark*, if those Dominions were to be attacked on account of his being engaged in support of the Interests of *Great Britain*; and still more unaccountable it would be, if the King should not, in the Quality of Elector, find the same Assistance from the *British* Nation, as he would be sure of having, if he were Elector only, and not King. And if we will but consider the Electorate of *Hanover* as an Ally of *Great Britain*, under the Engagements of mutual Guaranties like any other Sovereign State of the Empire, this Question is at an End; unless we vainly imagine, that we may lay down such preposterous Rules betwixt ourselves and other Nations, that our Cause shall on all Occasions be theirs, and that their Cause shall never be ours. If it were necessary to add any thing further upon this Head, I would ask those Gentlemen who clamour so loudly about *Hessian Troops* and *Hanover Dominions*; What would be the Difference, if Hostilities were begun in *Hanover*, or in any other Part of the World, in Alliance with us? Would not this equally be the Beginning of a general War, and involve *Europe* equally in all the dreadful Consequences of such a War?

Are we not then equally obliged both in Honour and Prudence, to prevent a War's being kindled there, as in any other Part of *Europe* in Alliance with us? And are we not engaged to repel and resent any Injuries, Insults, or Hostilities begun and committed there? Unless we will say, that the Elector of *Hanover* is the only Prince in *Europe* that is not to be regarded and supported as an Ally; and that the King's *German* Dominions are the only Country that is to be exposed to the common Fate and Dangers of a Confederacy, and not to be entitled to the common Benefits of Security and Protection arising from the same Obligations. It is true indeed, there is no formal Alliance between *Great Britain* and *Hanover*; for the Quality of King and Elector residing in the same Person, his Majesty could not contract with himself; but the Union betwixt the two Governments, and the Obligations of mutual Defence and Guaranty, are as strongly and necessarily implied, as the most formal Treaties and Conventions could possibly make them.

To conclude the Whole, I only desire that this Controversy may be confined to the true Merits of the Question, and not be perplexed and confounded with common-place Topicks, false Colours, and Misrepresentations: The single Question is, whether the taking the *Hessian* Troops into the Pay of *Great Britain*, was for the Honour and Interest of the King and this Kingdom, And whether the continuing them, is as yet equally necessary and advisable?

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Those who raile all the Clamour, and stir up all the Opposition, are very sensible, that upon this Foot, the Dispute will not bear a Moment's Debate. They therefore run from the Question, and harangue upon Taxes and the Debts of the Nation, upon sending so much of our Money abroad, upon Foreign Standing Armies and Foreign Forces, paid and supported at the Charge and Expence of this Nation, for the Sake only of Foreign Dominions. A most abominable Practice! to represent a Matter of publick Consideration and publick Utility, in the most odious and invidious Light, and in such a Manner, as shall create the most Discontent and Dissatisfaction, where the greatest Veneration, Duty, and Affection are due. But to this Necessity they are driven, and these Practices knowingly and designedly they carry on; for they are sensible of the fatal Tendency of these malicious Insinuations, and they know very well what would be the Consequence, if the Parliament should not consent to continue the *Hessian* Troops, until the State of Publick Affairs shall make it reasonable and advisable to discharge them.

Let them then confess what they certainly mean, and most certainly know; that to disband the *Hessians* immediately, would be to dissolve the present Alliances that the King is engaged in, and at once to discharge our Allies from all the Obligations they are under to do us Justice, and give us Satisfaction with Regard to our past Losses and Damages, and to secure and confirm to us all our Rights and Possessions, and Privileges

in Commerce, which we are at present most justly entitled to.

For let me suppose, the Parliament should begin with refusing to enable the King to make good his Engagements, and to raise the Quotas and Proportions stipulated by the present Treaties : all Apprehensions would at once be removed from the Emperour ; he would immediately see the Dissolution of that Alliance that can alone bring him to Reason : *France*, deserted by *England*, would enter into new Measures, and think no more of executing the Treaty of *Seville* : the States of *Holland*, forsaken and abandoned by their ancient and natural Ally, must consult their own Safety and Security, and venture no more to provoke the Resentment of the Emperour, or any other formidable Neighbour.

What then would the Court of *Spain* do ? What could they do but declare themselves free and discharged from all their Obligations, and at Liberty to pursue their own Views and Measures. And is there any *Englishman* that will say, he had rather the World should be thrown into all this Confusion, than that the *Hessian* Troops should be continued ? Let them cease to complain of the Distress of our Trade and Commerce, the Danger of losing *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*, the Obstinacy of *France* in not totally demolishing *Dunkirk*, who think it reasonable that we should at once cancel all our Obligations of Treaties.

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With what Face can they in one Breath reproach our Allies for failing in the minutest Points to execute their Engagements, and call upon the Parliament of *Great Britain* by one Resolution to dissolve all their own? Would these Gentlemen speak out, the Nation would soon judge between them and their Adversaries. Let them tell the People, without Disguise, what Dangers and Hazards they would expose the Nation to, if they could prevail to have the Foreign Troops disbanded in this Posture of Affairs: Let them give over the little Artifices of complaining, that we have any thing to do with the *Hanover* Dominions; and utter their Grief plainly, *That we have any Thing to do with the Elector of Hanover*. And who can help thinking but that those, who are so mean, in the present Circumstances of Things, to do the one, would readily, if it were equally safe for them, do the other. I mean those who are the chief Authors and Promoters of this furious Clamour against the *Hessian* Troops; for that several well-meaning Persons have been led away by an artful Misrepresentation of this Point, I verily believe. But if none, who have not the same Views and Designs with the pretended Patriots, will be drawn into the Snares that are daily laid for them, these impotent and malicious Efforts to distress the Government at Home, will prove as vain and ineffectual as their Endeavours have been in all Foreign Courts, to embarrass and obstruct the Measures concerted for the Interest and Advantage of the King and Kingdom.

F I N I S.